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1. Introduction
Beyond Budgeting was introduced by Hope and Fraser in 2003 (Hope 
and Fraser, 2003ab). The Beyond Budgeting Model (BBM) is not a conven-
tional single tool, but a thinking model including the Balanced Scorecard, 
Activity-based costing, Rolling Forecasts, and the relative improvement con-
tract. It is also a change management model to make an adaptive organization 
in which front-line employees are empowered to cope with today’s turbulent 
management environment.
Over ten years have passed since BBM was proposed but few Japanese 
companies have wholly introduced it. Only DISCO Corporation has abolished 
all use of a budget as far as I know (Shimizu, 2013).
On the other hand, Shimizu (2013) shows that some Japanese companies 
use the KPI Forecast Management Model to achieve the goal of BBM with-
out eliminating a budget itself or functions of budgeting. A typical example is 
Kyocera Corporation.
This paper shows that some Japanese companies largely achieve the 
goal of BBM without wholly stopping budgeting through comparison of the 
features of BBM and the Kyocera Management Model. This is important 
because although budgeting is a useful tool and most companies cannot man-
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age their operations without budgeting, many companies do not use it 
incorrectly. The object of this paper is to introduce a case in which a Japa-
nese company performs the idea of Beyond Budgeting while using budgeting 
and to show how this is a hybrid management tool of budgeting and BBM.
2. The Beyond Budgeting Model
The Beyond Budgeting Model, which was already explained in Hope and 
Fraser (2003b), was clearly specified in Bogsnes (2009). He divided the con-
cept of Beyond Budgeting into two categories of principles (leadership 
principles and process principles) as shown in Table 1⑴.
As mentioned above, BBM is a thinking model. That is because these 
leadership principles focus on managers’ way of thinking. A lot of manage-
ment tools have been developed since the late 20th century. It is certain that 
the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is typical of them. However, the introduction 
rate of BSC in Japan is lower than in Western countries⑵. I think that one of 
the reasons is that Japanese companies think of BSC as a tool rather than a 
thinking model to make essential strategies concrete. But however great a 
tool it is, it cannot produce an effect just by being introduced. To ensure the 
effective functioning of the tool, you need a proper guide to lead the tool in 
the right direction. Leadership principles enable an organization to under-
stand a goal to attain and to move toward the goal on its proper judgment. 
The organization to attain the goal becomes a seamless network toward cus-
tomers, and gains credit from them and rewards based on holistic 
performance, not each team’s performance and individual’s performance.
Process principles of BBM explain the tools of relative targets, the holis-
tic approach in deciding rewards, rolling forecasts, and continuous planning. 
However, in order to make these tools work properly, leadership principles 
need to be set appropriately and need to penetrate the organization.
Rolling forecasts (RFs) and relative targets (RTs) are tools with distinc-
tive features in BBM. RFs are updated quarterly (or monthly) and look four 
or five quarters (or twelve months) ahead. RFs enable managers to forecast 
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events in the future and to add or change actions as soon as possible when 
managers have the prospect of a gap between forecasts and plans. The 
essence of RFs is not only that companies forecast, but that they change a 
plan based on the forecast and keep a plan adapted to the realities of the situ-
ation. RFs that have a feedforward control system should be integrated into 
continuous planning.
Table 1　The Beyond Budgeting Principles
Leadership Principles
1. Customers Focus everyone on improving customer outcomes, not on hierar-
chical relationships.
2. Organization Organize as a network of lean, accountable teams, not around cen-
tralized functions.
3. Responsibility Enable everyone to act and think like a leader, not merely follow 
the plan.
4. Autonomy Give teams the freedom and capability to act; do not micromanage 
them
5. Values Govern through a few clear values, goals, and boundaries, not 
detailed rules and budgets.
6. Transparency Promote open information for self-management; do not restrict it 
hierarchically.
Process Principles
7. Goals Set relative goals for continuous improvement; do not negotiate 
fixed performance contracts. (Relative targets)
8. Rewards Reward shared success based on relative performance, not on 
meeting fixed targets. (Holistic approach)
9. Planning Make planning a continuous and inclusive process, not a top-down 
annual event. (Rolling forecast and continuous planning)
10. Controls Based controls on relative indicators and trends, not on variances 
against plan. (Relative targets)
11. Resources Make resources available as needed, not through annual budget 
allocations. (Rolling forecast and continuous planning)
12. Coordination Coordinate interactions dynamically, not through annual planning 
cycles. (Rolling forecast and continuous planning)
Adapted from Bogsnes (2009), p.55
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RTs are not a preset fixed target, but a way of setting a target superior 
to the rate of return or the profit of competitors. This gives a company the 
ability to recognize changes in the environment and take the best action to 
cope with them. Also, it makes managers recognize that it is extremely 
important for a company not to focus on profits but to control both inputs 
and outputs.
Finally, the holistic approach induces employees to recognize that they 
have to improve the performance of their team or the whole company, not of 
an individual.
3.  The situation regarding Beyond Budgeting in Japanese 
companies
As stated above, Beyond Budgeting was first introduced by Hope and 
Fraser (2003ab). They established a research institute called Beyond Budget-
ing Round Table (BBRT)⑶ and started to research a management model to 
build a vital organization capable of coping with changes in the environment. 
In addition to Hope and Fraser, many researchers have pointed out problems 
with budgets. For example, Hansen, et al. (2003, p.97) summarized the prob-
lems of budgets as follows:
a) as time goes by, assumptions of budgets are typically outdated,
b) budgetary controls impose a vertical command-and-control structure, cen-
tralize decision making, stifle initiative, and focus on cost reductions rather 
than value creation,
c) the command-and-control structure and center-focused budgetary controls 
are incompatible with flat, network, or value chain-based organizational 
designs.
At first BBRT emphasized the problems of budgets as above and 
insisted that not using budgets was important in the first place in order to 
overcome those problems. In addition, it indicated that those problems can be 
overcome by setting the Balanced Scorecard at the core of the performance 
management system and using RFs and RTs when setting a goal. After that, 
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Bogsnes, in charge of the practice of Beyond Budgeting at both Borealis and 
Statoil, took over this thinking from BBRT and discussed the details about 
BBM (Bogsnes, 2009).
However, Libby and Lindsey expressed skeptical opinions about those 
problems of budgets based on the result of their investigation. Libby and 
Lindsey (2010, p.67) insisted as below:
a) use of the fixed performance contract is much less,
b) subjective considerations or allowances for non controllable events are 
treated sophisticatedly by managers,
c) time spent on budgeting in the average in North America is considerably 
less than what advocators of beyond budgeting suggest and does not appear 
excessive,
d) many firms utilize adaptive processes to adapt to unpredictable environ-
ments by revising budgets very frequently.
Lorain (2010) investigated BBM processes at Spanish companies from 
2008 through 2009. As a result, she wrote, some companies “have imple-
mented RFs in order to cope with changing environment” and “RFs are a 
good complement to the traditional budgeting process, but they cannot 
replace it” (Lorain, 2010, p. 202).
Investigations in Japan also showed some negative results on the point of 
Beyond Budgeting. For example, while evaluation including subjective control 
directly lessened the effect of improving planning functions by budgeting, it 
improved vertical communication functions by connecting evaluation with a 
bonus (Senoo and Yokota, 2013). Horii (2013) indicated that in rapid changes in 
the environment control by budgeting brought about organizational learning 
and that if changes in the environment upset the premise of budgeting, 
adhering to fixed targets strengthened the promotion of strategic actions. 
Yokota and Senoo (2011) and Kishida (2014) also said that Japanese companies 
did not think of the budgeting problem as significant, contrary to Hope and 
Frasers’ assumption. That is the same result as existing research in North 
America and Europe.
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Do these results mean that Japanese companies never take budgeting as 
a big problem? I do not think so. Budgeting problems pointed out by Hope 
and Fraser essentially lie in management control. Japanese companies know 
that. Therefore, they may have come to the conclusions above as a result of 
making various modifications to conventional budgeting.
Actually, as far as I know, only Disco Corporation in Japan has adopted 
Beyond Budgeting Model and has wholly abandoned budgeting. This com-
pany produces industrial machinery for IT machinery manufacturers. Due to 
rapidly changing supply and demand in this company, budgeting was useless 
to it. Even under these circumstances, Disco Corporation previously made a 
budget. That is because the Tokyo Stock Exchange has been calling for fore-
cast information but this company frequently modified it by changes in the 
environment. As a result, the budget was made but wasn’t controlled. Finally 
this company wholly abandoned budgeting in 2013.
NEC was also significantly influenced by the Beyond Budgeting Model. 
This company started to study BBM in 2006 and has been adopting it partly 
since then. Especially it conducts RFs on some KPIs and has a system in 
which new action is taken when there is a gap between a forecasted value 
and a fixed target in a budget (Shimizu, 2013, pp. 180-186). However, NEC has 
not abandoned budgeting until now and has not achieved higher performance 
by adopting BBM for the last few years.
Kyocera Corporation has its own management model called Amoeba 
Management System. Kyocera eliminated a budget and uses Master Plan 
(MP) instead, which consists of three-year, annual, and monthly plans. Like 
BBM, this model motivates people to achieve a good result by using a fore-
cast. The organization is divided into small groups called Amoeba. They 
control themselves by Hourly Efficiency (HE) and their Income Statement for 
internal use. Kyocera makes a league-table of HE to encourage competition 
among amoebas. Each amoeba leader tries to make profits and improve its 
HE. It is hardly linked with employees’ bonuses. These actions are extremely 
similar to the twelve principles of Beyond Budgeting. By using the Kyocera 
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management model (KMM), Kyocera has never been in the red since its foun-
dation in 1959 and has made top-level profit in the electric industry for the 
last ten years. So I will compare KMM revealed in the studies with BBM and 
consider the similarities between the two models in the next section.
4. Leadership principles in KMM
(1) Values principles
Kyocera has very strong centripetal force. Its core is Kyocera philoso-
phy. Its corporate motto is “Respect the Divine and Love People” and its 
management system is based on the bonds of human minds. Kyocera also has 
twelve management principles as shown in Table 2.
Table 2　The Twelve Management Principles in Kyocera
1. Clearly state the purpose and mission of your business. Set high objectives that 
are noble, just and fair.
2. Set specific goals. Once targets are set, share them with all employees.
3. Keep a passionate desire in your heart. Your desire must be strong and persistent 
to penetrate into your subconscious mind.
4. Strive harder than anyone else. Work steadily and diligently, one step at a time, 
never relenting in tedious tasks.
5. Maximize revenues and minimize expenses. Measure your inflow and control your 
outflow; don’t chase profit, but let it follow your effort.
6. Pricing is management. Pricing is top management’s responsibility: to find that one 
point where customers are happy and the company is most profitable.
7. Success is determined by willpower. Business management requires a persistent, 
“rock-piercing” will.
8. Possess a fighting spirit. Management requires a more combative mentality than 
any material art.
9. Face every challenge with courage. Be fair and never deceive others.
10. Always be creative in your work. Innovate and improve continuously. Today 
should be better than yesterday; tomorrow, better than today.
11. Be kind and sincere. Business is based on partnerships and must bring happiness 
to all parties.
12. Always be cheerful and positive; hold great dreams and hopes in the pureness of 
your heart.
Source; http://global.kyocera.com/inamori/management/twelve.html
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These principles are the basis for all the employees’ behavior and penetrate 
deeply into all the employees in such a way that they begin to understand 
the content of principles in training for new recruits and follow the principles 
when making decisions every day. As mentioned later, the KMM is based on 
trust but trust is not formed without the Kyocera philosophy.
(2) Organization, Responsibility, and Autonomy principles
Next I will explain trust and accountability given to the organization 
structure and the organization of Kyocera. Kyocera is composed of functional 
organizations. Production organizations and sales organizations are divided 
into small, autonomic, and empowered organizations, which are called 
Amoeba. Production and sales amoebas are made up of 5 to 10 people each.
Each amoeba has an income statement and works as a profit center. 
However, the goal of each amoeba is to maximize profits of the whole com-
pany, not of an individual, and to contribute to make big profits.
Figure 1 shows the mechanism of the management of sales amoebas (SA) 
and production amoebas (PA). At first, a sales amoeba accepts an order from 
a customer and passes it to a production amoeba 2 (PA2). The transfer price 
between SA and PA2 is the price that this SA receives from a customer. 
Next, production amoeba 2 also places an order with PA1. PA1 and PA2 
negotiate the transfer price so that both might get profits.
After deciding the transfer price, every amoeba considers its own cost 
and working hours in order to make profits and Hourly Efficiency (HE) maxi-
mum. For a sales amoeba, the selling price equals to the transfer price to 
PA2. PA2 pays the sales commission, e.g. 10% of total sales, to a sales 
amoeba. A sales amoeba tries to make profits, added value by controlling its 
costs. PA2 and PA1 also try to make profits by controlling the costs. I will 
explain this system and HE later.
All the amoebas know the market price of their products. If sales amoe-
bas set a lower price on the products they would get many orders but it 
would be possibly unprofitable. In the contrary case, sales amoebas could not 
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get orders in the first place. So all the amoebas do not try to set the price or 
transfer prices in their favor because it does not contribute to maximize prof-
its of the whole company. Kyocera has a pricing policy that all the amoebas 
try to find the price that makes both customers (not only external customers 
but also internal customers and other amoebas) and Kyocera (or an amoeba) 
happy. Kyocera, therefore, stops employees from making suboptimized deci-
sions.
Figure 1　Sales Amoeba and Production Amoeba
All the amoebas take the optimum actions to maximize corporate profits like 
this. The amoebas are empowered to do so. For example, the leaders of pro-
duction amoebas even have the authority to make an additional capital 
investment when they judge that the investment can contribute to long-term 
profits.
HE and the income statement of each amoeba are disclosed at the 
review meeting. And at the meeting an amoeba’s leader has to explain what 
he/she did in order to maximize corporate profits and what the result was 
like. HE is also disclosed to all the employees with a league table.
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5. Process principles
(1) Amoeba’s income statement and HE
Table 3 is a sample of the income statement made by production amoe-
bas. HE is set as a kind of relative target. HE of all the amoebas is calculated 
and appears on the league table. An improvement in HE is not connected 
with bonuses of amoeba members and leaders but they make efforts to 
improve HE and to raise their ranking in the league table as if playing a 
game.
Table 3　Income Statement and Hourly Efficiency in production amoebas
Items Amounts
① = ② + ③ Gross Production 6,500,000
② 　Production Outside 4,000,000
③ 　Total Internal Sales 2,500,000
④ Total Internal Purchases 2,200,000
⑤ = ① - ④ Net Production 4,300,000
⑥ Deduction (Costs) 2,400,000
⑦ = ⑤ - ⑥ Added Value 1,900,000
⑧ Total Working Hours 35,000 hours
⑨ = ⑦ ÷ ⑧ Hourly Efficiency 54.28
⑩ = ⑤ ÷ ⑧ Production per Hour 122.85
Adapted from http://global.kyocera.com/inamori/management/amoeba/system.html
By the way, the income statement of the amoebas does not include labor 
costs. If labor costs are included in it, amoeba leaders may not select older 
employees as members. That is because Kyocera applies the seniority wage 
system in which the older the employee, the higher the salary. It is not good 
for Kyocera not to select senior members since it focuses on “the bond of 
human minds”.
So Kyocera calculates only total (company ‒ wide) labor costs and “Labor 
Costs Per Hour” (LCPH) of the whole company and gives this information to 
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all the amoebas. An amoeba makes a comparison between the company-wide 
LCPH and its HE, and if its HE is larger than the company-wide LCPH, it 
means that this amoeba contributes to company-wide profits.
(2)  Master Plan and Forecasted Income Statement ‒ Planning and control 
principles
Kyocera makes a three-year Master Plan (MP) on the rolling system. 
Based on the three-year MP, it makes an annual MP and then deploys it to a 
monthly MP.
The most remarkable feature in the Kyocera management system is the 
way of realizing the monthly MP. I will explain it by using Table 4.
What action will amoeba leaders take if they find that the forecasted 
profits may not reach ones in the MP? First they probably try to increase 
the sales volume. However, if final customers do not place an order, the sales 
volume will not increase. Increasing the production volume without orders 
just causes an increase in inventories. Therefore, production amoeba leaders 
often visit their customers with sales persons, and take an order by research-
Table 4　Forecasted Income Statement of Production Amoebas
MP Plan difference Actual Action
Gross Production
Total Internal Sales
　　Net Production
Deduction (Costs)
…
…
…
Added Value
　Total Working Hours
　　Hourly Efficiency
Adapted from MIYA, H. (2003) The Theory of AMOEBA Management, Toyokeizai-Shinpousha, p.93.
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ing customers’ needs and making suggestions for them. Still, if the profit 
target is not achieved, the amoeba leaders try to reduce even costs included 
in the MP and aim to achieve the profit target.
This income statement is reported at the monthly performance review 
meeting. Amoeba leaders and senior managers are required to give an expla-
nation in detail about the performance for the previous month and the plan 
for the current month. They are always required to produce the best figure 
and their minds are also encouraged to do so by Kyocera philosophy. If an 
amoeba leader sets a low target and makes the income statement easy to 
realize, his or her intention will be exposed to other leaders and managers at 
the performance review meeting and he or she will be urged to modify the 
income statement. This is also connected with the transparency principle.
(3) Forecasting system
This is a forecasting system in Kyocera. As shown in Table 4, the 
income statement of each amoeba has an MP and a plan. Amoeba leaders 
also have to forecast sales and costs for the next two months. As shown in 
Figure 2, this system is a three-month-rolling forecast although there are a 
few exceptions. In July, an amoeba does not forecast the income statement in 
October because it has already started to forecast the income statement of 
Figure 2　Rolling Planning in Kyocera
PLN: Plan
FCT: Forecast
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the second half year. After predicting IS of the second half year, an amoeba 
sets a revised MP.
(4) The integration of feedforward and feedback management
The Kyocera system consists of both feedforward and feedback manage-
ment. First, each amoeba forecasts and makes a new plan to accomplish its 
MP. This is feedforward management. Amoeba leaders compare the profit in 
the MP with the forecasted one and if there is a gap between them, new 
action plans to accomplish the profit target in the MP are considered and 
implemented. Second, at the end of every month, Kyocera does feedback con-
trol by comparing actual and new planned profits and the target profits in 
the MP. The important thing is to review the difference between forecasted 
and actual results because in the case of Kyocera, new planned profit is not 
simply forecasted but a kind of new planned number.
As shown in Figure 3, Kyocera integrates a feedback system with a 
feedforward system into one management system. In other words, based on 
the comparison of MP and forecasted and newly planned amounts as well as 
the comparison of the MP and actual amounts used in the feedback system, 
the structure of making the plan over newly is incorporated into the manage-
ment system.
This is the extremely important point. A forecast is simply a forecast. As 
pointed out in BBM, the purpose for forecasting is to see changing environ-
Figure 3　Feedforward and feedback management in Kyocera
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ments and reach the target. The Kyocera management system has a process 
that a forecast is not only made but also a new plan is made or the MP is 
modified to fill the gap immediately if a gap between forecasts and targets is 
seen. Without this process, it seems to be difficult to use a forecast effec-
tively.
(5) Transparency ‒ Open book management
Amoeba managers have to attend the performance review meeting at 
the end of every month and give an explanation in detail about performance 
results of that month, changed plans of the next month, and forecasts of the 
following two months. Because a lot of amoebas conducting similar businesses 
like this exist in Kyocera, if an amoeba sets planned profits of the next month 
too low, it is exposed to the other amoebas.
Figure 4　Open book management in Kyocera
And even if an amoeba leader is able to set planned profits of the next 
month low by gaming, it will be revealed to the other amoeba leaders that 
the planned profits are too low at the end of the next month.
Also, in Kyocera it is not accepted that actual profits not only fall below 
but also exceed planned profits modified monthly. That is because planned 
profits based on a forecast do not have stretch.
Thus, amoeba leaders have to always set the best targets because all of 
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the information is disclosed to their peers as well as to their bosses.
However, although amoebas’ HE and IS are disclosed, there is little rela-
tionship between their HE and IS and amoeba members’ bonuses. Bonuses 
are decided by the profits of the whole company. So the reward system is a 
kind of holistic system.
6.  Similarity between the Kyocera amoeba management 
and 12 principles of Beyond Budgeting
(1) Leadership principles
Table 5 shows similarities between the Kyocera management system 
and leadership principles by Bogsnes (2009) that I described above.
Table 5　BBM and Kyocera Leadership Principles Compared (1)
Leadership principles Bogsnes (2009) p. 55 Kyocera system
1. Customers Focus everyone on improv-
ing customer outcomes, not 
on hierarchical relationships.
Kyocera focuses on the 
outside market, or custom-
ers.
2. Organization Organize as a network of 
lean, accountable teams, not 
around centralized functions.
Each amoeba is a lean and 
accountable team.
3. Responsibility Enable everyone to act and 
think like a leader, not 
merely follow the plan.
Each amoeba leader acts and 
thinks to make profits by 
their decision making.
4. Autonomy Give teams the freedom and 
capability to act; do not 
micromanage them.
Each amoeba has the free-
dom and capability to act.
5. Values Govern through a few clear 
values, goals, and boundaries, 
not detailed rules and 
budgets.
Every employee acts based 
on the Kyocera Philosophy.
6. Transparency Promote open information for 
self management: do not 
restrict it hierarchically.
HE is opened to all the 
employees. Forecasted and 
Actual IS are also opened at 
the performance review 
meeting.
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First, both BBM and Kyocera focus on customers rather than the inside 
of the organization (Customers principle). Second, both BBM and Kyocera are 
managed by a lot of small divided units. In Kyocera, they are called amoebas, 
each of which has responsibility for HE and profits (Organization principle). 
Third, similar to BBM, in Kyocera each amoeba leader makes decision so 
that his or her amoeba will earn a profit, takes action on the decision, and has 
a responsibility for the result of the action (Responsibility principle). For this 
reason, as in BBM, each amoeba at Kyocera is empowered to make decisions 
and take action (Autonomy principle). An amoeba is controlled according to 
the principles called Kyocera philosophy as a source of the organization cul-
ture, not the rules formulated in detail. Also, in both BBM and Kyocera, 
values are key. For example, Kyocera philosophy has a large number of con-
tents (Value principle). Finally, transparency is important in both BBM and 
Kyocera. At Kyocera, HE and forecast-based plans are distributed and dis-
cussed at the various meetings. Thanks to this, other amoeba leaders and 
middle managers are able to know whether the plan has an appropriate 
stretch or not. That is how Kyocera is able to avoid gaming on setting a goal.
(2) Process principles
Next, I will compare the Kyocera management system and the BBM 
Process principles as shown in Table 6. It shows that the management tools 
used in Kyocera match the Beyond Budgeting principles.
At Kyocera, the HE of each amoeba is disclosed to all the employees as 
a league-table. Therefore, an amoeba leader makes an effort to improve his/
her HE and raise the rank in the league-table. This is a counterpart of BBM’s 
relative goals for continuous improvement as a Goals principles. However, 
profit targets of amoebas are basically fixed targets and Kyocera as a whole 
does not have relative targets for the rank in the industry.
Regarding rewards, at Kyocera HE and profit targets are not directly 
connected to a bonus of each amoeba leader. Similar to BBM, the bonus 
depends on company-wide profit amounts, although of course an amoeba 
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leader who achieves outstanding performance gets a promotion.
Also, Kyocera makes a forecast three months ahead and reviews the 
plan of the following month monthly in order to achieve MP. This just means 
flexibly remaking a plan on rolling forecasts and is a counterpart of BBM’s 
Planning principle. Control by relative HE at Kyocera is a counterpart of 
BBM’s Controls principle. By checking the difference between original MP 
and a new plan on forecasts and the difference between the plan and actual 
performance, control is exercised to reach annual targets. If resources not 
included in the original MP are needed, an amoeba leader is able to use the 
resources consulting a manager, similar to BBM’s Resources principle. 
Finally, similar to BBM, coordination at Kyocera is exercised by a close inter-
Table 6　BBM and Kyocera Process Principles Compared (2)
Process Principles Bogsnes (2009) p. 55 Kyocera system
7. Goals Set relative goals for continu-
ous improvement; do not 
negotiate fixed performance 
contracts.
Each amoeba sets a target of 
HE and Added Value. HE is 
compared among amoebas. 
But Kyocera as a whole does 
not have relative targets.
8. Rewards Reward shared success 
based on relative perfor-
mance, not on meeting fixed 
targets.
HE and Added Value of each 
amoeba are scarcely linked 
with employees’ bonus.
9. Planning Make planning a continuous 
and inclusive process, not a 
top-down annual event.
Each amoeba uses a certain 
type of Rolling Forecast and 
Rolling Plan.
10. Controls Base controls on relative 
indicators and trends, not on 
variances against plan.
Each amoeba is controlled by 
the HE and variances against 
Master Plan and Forecast.
11. Resources Make resources available as 
needed, not through annual 
budget allocations.
Each amoeba makes 
resources available as 
needed.
12. Coordination Coordinate interactions 
dynamically, not through 
annual planning cycles.
Coordination with each 
amoeba is interactive.
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action between production amoebas and sales amoebas, and each amoeba 
aims to realize MP.
7. Conclusions
I have explained how Kyocera is a case of BBM in Japan by comparing 
the Kyocera management model (KMM) and BBM. As shown in Table 5 and 
6, it is clear that the KMM practices all the principles of BBM. However, 
Kyocera has never learned Beyond Budgeting. Mr. Inamori has aimed to 
keep achieving higher performance since the establishment of Kyocera in 
1959. For this purpose, the entire staff has employed measures by trial and 
error to strive for higher performance. Consequently the present manage-
ment system was completed. In the process Mr. Inamori expressed the word 
“budget” as “Master Plan”. That is because he had also been aware well of 
budgeting problems pointed out by BBRT.
He thought that all the employees should continuously have a flexible 
plan by using a forecast in order to obtain the goal. Also, he empowered 
front-line managers, or amoeba leaders, and inspired them to strive for maxi-
mization of amoebas’ profits. He plainly explained knowledge about 
management accounting as HE and the internal IS. In this way amoeba lead-
ers understood that maximization of profits in each amoeba directly led to 
maximization of profits in the whole company. Amoeba leaders increase sales, 
reduce costs, and plan to use working hours effectively by themselves. Man-
agement tools to do these are counterparts of various process principles as 
shown in Table 6.
One of the noticeable features of KMM is that it keeps planning and 
coordinating functions of budgeting in MP. In this way, Kyocera does not 
absolutely abolish the budgeting system. KMM is a sophisticated model case 
that overcomes the problems of budgeting while using budgeting, not abolish-
ing budgeting. Companies can avoid many disruptions that might happen by 
abolishing budgeting by using this management model.
However, the KMM does not consists entirely of management tools. In 
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order to carry out these management tools properly, that is, to set a stretch 
target, aim for the optimization of the company, eliminate various gamings, 
and form an organization able to cope with changes in the environment, Mr. 
Inamori created the Kyocera philosophy and taught all the employees that 
they should do right as humans. All these management tools cannot work 
correctly without the strong values of the Kyocera philosophy.
The KMM was created in Japan, geographically and culturally so far 
from Northern Europe, or the home of Beyond Budgeting⑷. Nevertheless it is 
surprising that these two systems are quite alike in content. This seems to 
give a clue to the universal solution to overcome problems associated with a 
budget. Whether a company has a budget or not, and whether it uses BSC 
and ABC or not, it is able to conduct better management. The case of Kyoc-
era shows that.
However, not so many Japanese companies use the Kyocera manage-
ment system and even the companies adopting amoeba management do not 
necessarily have the same form of use as the basic amoeba management. A 
certain company adopting amoeba management in the hospitality industry 
and Japan Airline have the income statement of each amoeba but do not use 
HE for its management. The companies individually use an effective device 
for allocating indirect costs. The important thing is not to adopt a manage-
ment tool but to build up the organization culture aiming to achieve a goal 
through the organization. The tool should be coordinated according to the 
idea of each company.
As mentioned before, Japanese companies do not have much dissatisfac-
tion with the budgeting system. That seems to be because Japanese 
companies made different improvements to the budgeting system. The Kyoc-
era management system is considered to be a case of those improved 
systems.
This paper is a part of the outcome of research performed under a Waseda 
University Grant for Special Research Projects (Project number: 2014B-147).
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Notes
　⑴　12 principles shown by Bogsnes are rearranged by BBRT afterwards and changed as follows.
The Modified Beyond Budgeting Principles
Change in leadership Change in processes
Governance & Transparency Goals & rewards
1. Value ‒ Bind people to a common cause; not 
to a central plan
7. Goals ‒ Set ambitious medium-term goals; 
not short-term fixed targets
2. Governance ‒ Govern through shared values 
and sound judgment; not detailed rules and 
regulations
8. Rewards ‒ Base rewards on relative 
performance; not on meeting fixed targets
3. Transparency ‒ Make information open and 
transparent; don’t restrict and control it
Planning & controls
Accountable teams 9. Planning ‒ Make planning a continuous and 
inclusive process; not a top-down annual event
4. Teams ‒ Organize around a seamless 
network of accountable teams; not around 
centralized functions
10. Coordination ‒ Coordinate interactions 
dynamically; not through annual budgets and 
planning cycles
5. Trust ‒ Trust teams to regulate and 
improve their performance; don’t micro-man-
age them
11. Resources ‒ Make resources available as 
needed; not through annual budget allocations
6. Accountability ‒ Base accountability on 
holistic criteria and peer reviews; not on 
hierarchical relationships.
12. Controls ‒ Base controls on fast frequent 
feedback; not on budget variances.
(Olsen, 2014, p.18)
　　In the modified Table, leadership principles are arranged and reclassified into Governance & 
Transparency and Accountable teams.
⑵　According to some researches (Aoki・Sakurai, 2003: Otomasa, 2003: Liu, 2004: Morisawa et 
al, 2005) conducted from 2002 to 2005 in Japan, the rate of utilization of BSC ranged from 4% to 
19%.
⑶　Now BBRT is a shared learning network within Beyond Budgeting Institute established in 
2013.
⑷　Hofstede (1980), which is a rather old paper, studied the 40 countries’ positions in the indica-
tors of “the power distance” and “the uncertainty avoidance”. Consequently in Northern 
European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland) the power distance was small 
and the uncertainty avoidance was weak. In Japan, the power distance was large and the 
uncertainty avoidance was strong.
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